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Abstract
In this note, we present an existence result of a Nash equilibrium be-
tween electricity producers selling their production on an electricity mar-
ket and buying CO2 emission allowances on an auction carbon market.
The producers’ strategies integrate the coupling of the two markets via the
cost functions of the electricity production. We set out a clear Nash equi-
librium that can be used to compute equilibrium prices on both markets
as well as the related electricity produced and CO2 emissions covered.
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to develop analytic tools, in order to design a relevant
mechanism for carbon markets, where relevant refers to emission reduction.
For this purpose, we focus on electricity producers in a power market linked
to a carbon market. In this context, where the number of agents is limited,
a standard game theory approach applies. The producers are considered as
players behaving on the two financial markets represented here by carbon and
electricity. We establish a Nash equilibrium for this non-cooperative J-player
game through a coupling mechanism between the two markets.
The original idea comes from the French electricity sector, where the spot
electricity market is often used to satisfy peak demand. Producers behavior
is demand driven and linked to the maximum level of electricity production.
Each producer strives to maximize its market share. In the meantime, it has
to manage the environmental burden associated with its electricity production
through a mechanism inspired by the EU ETS1 framework : each producer
emission level must be balanced by a permit or through the payment of a penalty.
Emission permit allocations are simulated through a carbon market that allows
the producers to buy the allowances at an auction. Our focus on the electricity
sector is motivated by its introduction in phase III of the EU ETS, and its
prevalence in the emission share. In the present paper, the design assumptions
made on the carbon market are dedicated to foster emissions reduction in the
entire electricity sector.
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Based on a static elastic demand curve (referring to the times stages in an
organized electricity market, mainly day-ahead and intra-day), we solve the local
problem of establishing a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium for the two coupled
markets.
While literature mainly addresses profit maximization, our share maximiza-
tion approach deals with profit through specific assumptions: sale at no loss and
striking a balance between the purchase of allowances and the carbon footprint
of the electricity generated. Here the market is driven through demand dynam-
ics rather than electricity spot prices dynamics as it has been done in recent
works (see [5][4] [6]).
In Section 2, we formalize the markets (carbon and electricity) rules and the
associated admissible set of players’ coupled strategies. We then first study the
Nash equilibrium on the electricity market alone (see Proposition 3.1). Section
3 is devoted to our Nash equilibrium results.
2 Coupling markets mechanism
2.1 Electricity market
In the electricity market, the demand is aggregated and summarized by a func-
tion p 7→ D(p), where D(p) is the quantity of electricity that buyers are ready
to obtain at maximal unit price p. We assume the following :
Assumption 2.1. The demand function D(·) : [0,+∞)→ [0+∞) is decreasing,
left continuous, and such that D(0) > 0.
Each producer j ∈ {1, . . . , J} is characterized by a finite production capacity
κj and a bounded and increasing function cj : [0, κj ] −→ R
+ that associates
a marginal production cost to any quantity q of electricity. These marginal
production costs depend on several exogenous parameters reflecting the techni-
cal costs associated with electricity production e.g. energy prices, O&M costs,
taxes, carbon penalties etc... This parameter dependency makes possible to
build different market coupling mechanisms. In the following we use it to link
the carbon and the electricity markets.
The merit order ranking features marginal cost functions sorted according
to their production costs. These are therefore increasing staircase functions
whereby each stair refers to the marginal production cost of a specific unit
owned by the producer.
The producers trade their electricity on a dedicated market. For a given
producer j, the strategy consists in a function that makes it possible to establish
an ask price on the electricity market, defined as
sj :Cj × R
+ −→ R+
(cj(·), q) −→ sj(cj(·), q),
where Cj the set of marginal production cost functions are explicitly given
in the following (see (12)).
sj(cj(·), q) is the unit price at which the producer is ready to sell quantity q of
electricity. An admissible strategy fulfills the following sell at no loss constraint
sj(cj(·), q) ≥ cj(q), ∀q ∈ Dom(cj). (1)
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For example we can take sj(cj(·), q) = cj(q) or sj(cj(·), q) = cj(q)+λ(q), where
λ(q) stands for any additional profit.
As mentioned in the introduction, the constraint (1) guarantees profitable trade
in as much as equilibrium established through this class of strategy will bring
benefit to each producer. This establishes a link between market share maxi-
mization and profit maximization paradigms.
Let us denote S as the class of admissible strategy profiles on electricity
market. We have
S =


s = (s1, . . . , sj); sj : Cj × R+ −→ R+
(cj(·), q) −→ sj(cj(·), q)
such that sj(cj(·), q) ≥ cj(q), ∀q ∈ Dom(cj)

 . (2)
As a function of q, sj(cj(·), q) is bounded on Dom(cj). For the sake of clarity,
we define for each q 6∈ Dom(cj), sj(cj(·), q) = plolc, where plolc is the loss of load
cost, chosen as any overestimation of the maximal production costs.
For producer j’s strategy sj , we define the associated ask size at price p as
O(cj(·), sj ; p) := sup{q, sj(cj(·), q) < p}. (3)
Hence O(cj(·), sj ; p) is the maximum quantity of electricity at unit price p sup-
plied by producer j on the market.
Remark 2.1.
(i) The ask size function p 7→ O(cj(·), sj ; p) is, with respect to p, an increasing
surjection from [0,+∞) to [0, κj], right continuous and such that O(cj(·), sj ; 0) =
0. For an increasing strategy sj, O(sj ; .) is its generalized inverse function with
respect to q.
(ii) Given two strategies q 7→ sj(cj(·), q) and q 7→ s′j(cj(·), q) such that sj(cj(·), q) ≤
s′j(cj(·), q), for all q ∈ Dom(cj) we have for any positive p
O(cj(·), sj ; p) ≥ O(cj(·), s
′
j ; p).
Indeed, if p1 ≥ p2 then {q, sj(cj(·), q) ≤ p2} ⊂ {q, sj(cj(·), q) ≤ p1} from which
we deduce that O(cj(·), sj ; ·) is increasing. Next, if sj(cj(·), ·) ≤ s′j(cj(·), ·), for
any fixed p, we have {q, s′j(cj(·), q) ≤ p} ⊂ {q, sj(cj(·), q) ≤ p} from which the
reverse order follows for the asks.
We now describe the electricity market clearing. Note that from the mar-
ket view point, the dependency of the offers with respect to the marginal cost
does not need to be explicit. For the sake of clarity, we will write sj(q) and
O(sj ; p) instead of sj(cj(·), q), O(cj(·), sj ; p). The dependency will be expressed
explicitly whenever needed.
By aggregating the J ask size functions, we can define the overall supply
function p 7→ O (s; p) for producers strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sJ) as :
O (s; p) =
J∑
j=1
O(sj ; p). (4)
Hence, for any producer strategy profile s, O (s; p) is the quantity of electricity
that can be sold on the market at unit price p.
The overall supply function p 7→ O (s; p) is an increasing surjection defined
from [0,+∞) to [0,
∑J
j=1 κj], such that O (s; 0) = 0.
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2.1.1 Electricity market clearing
Taking producers strategy profile s = (s1(·), . . . , sJ (·)) the market sets the elec-
tricity market price pelec(s) together with the quantities (q1(s), . . . , qJ(s)) of
electricity sold by each producer.
The market clearing price pelec(s) is the unit price paid to each producer
for the quantities qj(s) of electricity. The price p(s) may be defined as a price
whereby offer satisfies the demand. As we are working with a general non-
increasing demand curve (eventually locally inelastic), the price that satisfies the
demand is not necessarily unique. We thus define the clearing price generically
with the following definition.
Definition 2.1 (The clearing electricity price.). Let us define
p(s) = inf {p > 0; O (s; p) > D(p)}
and
p(s) = sup
{
p ∈ [p(s), plolc];D(p) = D(p(s))
} (5)
with the convention that inf ∅ = plolc. The clearing price may then be established
as any pelec(s) ∈ [p(s), p(s)] as an output of a specific market clearing rule. For
consistency of the price, the market rule must be such that for any two strategy
profiles s and s′,
if p(s) < p(s′) then pelec(s) < pelec(s′),
if p(s) = p(s′) then pelec(s) = pelec(s′).
(6)
Note that p(s) 6= p(s) only if the demand curve p 7→ D(p) is constant on
some interval [p(s), p(s) + ǫ].
0 price
quantity
•
•
•
•
Total offer p 7→ O (p)
•
•
Demand p 7→ D(p)
•
•
•
•
•
•
p(s)
•
p(s)
•quantity sold
Note also that price p(s) is well defined in the case where demand does not
strictly decrease. This includes the case where demand is constant. In such
case, p(s) = plolc only if the demand curve never crosses the offer.
Next, we define the quantity of electricity sold at price pelec(s). When
O (s; pelec(s)) ≤ D(pelec(s)), each producer sells O(sj ; pelec(s)), but cases where
O (s; pelec(s)) > D(pelec(s)) may occur, requiring the introduction of an auxil-
iary rule to share D(pelec(s)) among the producers that propose O (s; pelec(s)).
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In such a case, p(s) is a discontinuity point of O (s; ·) and/or p(s) < pelec(s).
We can split the offer as follows:
O (s; pelec(s)) =
J∑
j=1
O(sj ; p(s)
−) +
J∑
j=1
∆−O(sj ; p
elec(s)),
where ∆−O(sj ; p
elec(s)) := O(sj ; p
elec(s))−O(sj ; p(s)
−).
The market’s choice is to fully accept the ask size of producers with contin-
uous ask size curve at point p(s−). For producers with discontinuous ask size
curve at pelec(s), a market rule based on proportionality that favors abundance,
is used to share the remaining part of the supply. More precisely we define
ϕj(s), the quantity of electricity sold by j, as
ϕj(s) =


O(sj ; pelec(s)),
if D(pelec(s)) ≥ O (s; pelec(s)),
O(sj ; p(s)−) + ∆−O(sj ; pelec(s))
D(pelec(s))−O (s; p(s)−)
∆−O (s; pelec(s))
,
if D(pelec(s)) < O (s; pelec(s)),
(7)
where ∆−O (s; pelec(s)) :=
∑J
j=1∆
−O(sj ; pelec(s)) > 0.
Note that, when D(pelec(s)) < O (s; pelec(s)) then ∆−O (s; pelec(s)) > 0. Note
also that we always have
J∑
i=1
ϕj(s) = D(p
elec(s)) ∧ O (s; pelec(s)). (8)
2.2 Carbon market
Producers are penalized according to their emission level if they do not own
allowances. Hence independently from their position on the electricity market,
producers buy CO2 emission allowances on a CO2 auction market. This market
has a finite known quantity W of CO2 emission allowances available.
On this market, producers adopt a strategy that consists in a series of bids
which may be reorganized in a decreasing function w 7→ Aj(w) defined from
[0,+∞) to [0,+∞). Quantity Aj(w) is the unit price that producer j is ready
to pay for quantity w of CO2 allowance. A denotes the strategy profile set on
the CO2 market,
A := {A = (A1, . . . , AJ); s.t. Ak : [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞) is decreasing }.
Strategy Aj is associated with a supply (to buy) function, denoted by p 7→
Θ(Aj ; p). The quantity Θ(Aj ; p) is the maximum quantity that producer j is
ready to buy at price p. It is a decreasing left continuous function defined as
Θ(Aj ; p) = sup{w, Aj(w) ≥ p}.
The CO2 market reacts by aggregating the J offers byΘ(A; p) =
∑J
j=1Θ(Aj ; p),
and the clearing market price is established following a second item auction as :
pCO2(A) := inf{p, Θ(A; p) < W}. (9)
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Figure 1: Clearing on the allowances market
Note that pCO2(A) = 0 indicates that there are too many allowances. It is
worth a reminder here, that the aim of allowances is to decrease emissions. In
section 3.3, we discuss a design hypothesis (assumption 3.3 ) that guarantees
an equilibrium price pCO2(A) > 0. Therefore, in the following, we assume that
the overall quantity W of allowances, is such that pCO2(A) > 0.
By Definition (9), we have Θ(A; pCO2(A)) ≥ W and Θ(A; pCO2(A)+) ≤
W.
Producers with (Θ(Aj ; p
CO2(A)) > 0 each obtain the following quantity
δj(A) of allowances
δj(A) :=


Θ(Aj ; p
CO2(A)),
if ∆+Θ(Aj ; p
CO2(A)) = 0,
Θ(Aj ; p
CO2(A)+) + ∆+Θ(Aj ; p
CO2(A))
(
W−Θ(A; pCO2(A)+)
)
∆+Θ(A; pCO2(A))
,
otherwise
(10)
where ∆+f(x) := f(x)− f(x+).
2.3 Carbon and electricity markets coupling
As mentioned earlier, for each producer, the marginal cost function is parametrized
by the positions A of the producers on the carbon market. Indeed, producer
j can obtain CO2 emission allowances on the market to avoid penalization for
(some of) its emissions. Those emissions that are not covered by allowances are
penalized at a unit rate p.
A profile of an offer to buy from the producersA = (A1, . . . , AJ), through the
CO2 market clearing, corresponds to a unit price of p
CO2(A) of the allowance
and quantities δj(A) of allowances bought by each producer (defined by the
market rules (9),(10)).
We assume that for all producers the emission rate, ej , is constant. Then,
the marginal production cost function cAj (·), parametrized by the emission reg-
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ulations, comes out as
q 7→ cAj (q) =


cj(q) + ejp
CO2(A), for 0 < q ≤
δj(A)
ej
cj(q) + ejp, for
δj(A)
ej
< q ≤ κj ,
(11)
where cj(·) stands for the marginal production cost without any emission regu-
lation.
In this coupled market setting, the strategy of producer j thus makes a pair
(Aj , sj). The set of admissible strategy profile is defined as
Σ = {(A, s); A ∈ A , s ∈ S} ,
where in the definition (2), we use
Cj =
{
cAj ; A ∈ A
}
. (12)
To any strategy profile (A, s) ∈ Σ, through the market mechanisms described,
corresponds prices for allowances and electricity, pCO2((A, s)) and pelec((A, s)),
quantities of allowances bought by each producer, δj((A, s)) and market shares
on electricity market ϕj((A, s)) of each producer.
3 Nash Equilibrium
3.1 Definition
We suppose that the J producers behave non cooperatively, aiming at maxi-
mizing their individual market share on the electricity market. For a strategy
profile (A, s) ∈ Σ, the market share of a producer j depends upon its strategy
(Aj , sj(·)) but also on the strategies (A−j , s−j) of the other producers 2. In this
set-up the natural solution is the Nash equilibrium (see e.g. [1]). More precisely
we are looking for a strategy profile
(A∗, s∗) = ((A∗1, s
∗
1), · · · , (A
∗
J , s
∗
J)) ∈ Σ
that satisfies Nash equilibrium conditions: none of the producers would strictly
benefit, that is, would strictly increase its market share from a unilateral devia-
tion. Namely, for any producer j strategy (Aj , sj) such that ((A
∗
−j , s
∗
−j); (Aj , sj)) ∈
Σ, we have 3
ϕj((A
∗, s∗)) ≥ ϕj((A
∗
−j , s
∗
−j); (Aj , sj)), (13)
where qj is the quantity of electricity sold. Note that the dependency in terms
of A through the marginal cost cAj is now explicit in qj .
Condition (13) has to be satisfied for any unilateral deviation of any producer
j. In particular (13) has to be satisfied for a producer j admissible deviation
(A∗j , sj) such that ((A
∗
−j , s
∗
−j); (A
∗
j , sj)) ∈ Σ of producer j that would change
2Here v−j stands for the profile (vi, · · · , vj−1, vj+1, · · · , vJ ).
3(v−j ; v) stands for (v1, · · · vj−1, v, vj+1, · · · vJ )
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its behavior only on the electricity market. Consequently, Nash equilibrium for
the electricity component component s∗ of the Nash equilibrium is also a Nash
equilibrium for a game where producers only behave on an electricity market
with marginal production costs cA
∗
j (·), j = 1, · · ·J .
The Nash equilibrium for a game restricted to the electricity market char-
acterizes the s∗ component for the coupled market game equilibrium.
Note that, if s∗ is the producers behavior on the electricity market at the
Nash equilibrium, any behavior A on the CO2 market, such that the strategy
profile (A, s∗) is admissible yields to the same market share for each producer.
Next section focuses on determining a Nash equilibrium on the game re-
stricted to the electricity market.
3.2 Equilibrium on Power market
In this restricted set-up, we consider that the marginal costs {cj, j = 1 . . . , J}
are known data, possibly fixed through the position A on the CO2 market.
In this section, we refer to S as the set of admissible strategy profiles,in the
particular case where Cj = {cj} for each j = 1, . . . , J .
The Nash equilibrium problem is as follows : find a strategy profile s∗ =
(s∗1, . . . , s
∗
J) ∈ S such that
∀j, ∀ sj 6= s
∗
j , ϕj(s
∗) ≥ ϕj(s
∗
−j ; sj). (14)
The following proposition exhibits a Nash equilibrium, whereby each pro-
ducer must choose the strategy denoted by Cj , and referred to as marginal
production cost strategy. It is defined by
Cj(q) =
{
cj(q), for q ∈ Dom(cj)
plolc, for q 6∈ Dom(cj).
(15)
Proposition 3.1.
(i) For any strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , sJ), no producer j ∈ {1, . . . , J} can be
penalized by deviating from strategy sj to is marginal production cost strategy
Cj, namely,
ϕj(s) ≤ ϕ(s−j;Cj). (16)
In other words, Cj is a dominant strategy for any producer j.
(ii) The strategy profile C = (C1, . . . CJ ) is a Nash equilibrium.
(iii) If the strategy profile s ∈ S is a Nash equilibrium, then we have pelec(s) =
pelec(C) and for any producer j, ϕj(s) = ϕj(C).
Point (ii) of the previous proposition is a direct consequence of the dominance
property (i). The proof of both (i) and (iii) can be found in [3]. Point (ii) of the
proposition exhibits a Nash equilibrium strategy profile. Clearly this equilibrium
is not unique since we can easily show that a producer’s given supply can follow
from countless different strategies. Nevertheless point (iii) shows that for any
Nash equilibrium, the associated electricity prices are the same and the quantity
of electricity bought by any producer j are the same for all equilibrium profiles.
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3.3 Coupled markets design through Nash equilibrium
From this point we restrict our attention to a particular design of the market.
In the following, the scope of the analysis applies to a special class of producers,
a specific electricity market price clearing (satisfying Definition 2.1), a range of
quantities of allowances available on the CO2 market. Although not necessary,
the following restriction brings simplifications to the development.
Assumption 3.1. On the producers. Each producer j operates a single
production unit (with emission rate ej), for which
(i) The marginal production cost is as in Equation (11), where the contribu-
tion that does not depend on the producer positions A in the CO2 market
is constant, cj(q) = cj.
(ii) The producers are two by two different : ∀i, j ∈ {1, · · ·J}, (ci, ei) 6= (cj , ej).
For a given strategy profile on the electricity market, Definition 2.1 gives a
range of possible determination for the electricity price. Previously, the analysis
of the Nash Equilibrium restricted to the electricity market, did not require a
precise clearing price determination. Nevertheless to extend our analysis of the
coupling we need to explicit this determination and assume the following :
Assumption 3.2. On the market electricity For a given strategy profile s
of the producers, the clearing price of electricity is p(s) = p(s), where p(s) is
defined in Definition 2.1 by Equation (5).
As previously noted, this choice of electricity price ensures that for any
strategy profile s, for any positive ǫ we have D(p(s) + ǫ) < D(p(s)), for any
strategy profile s. This property is necessary for the main theorem 3.1 proof.
The quantity W of CO2 allowances available on the market plays a crucial
role in the market design. As a matter of fact, if this quantity is too large, its
price on market will drop to zero, leaving the market incapable of fulfilling its
role of decreasing CO2 emissions. Therefore we clearly need to make an assump-
tion that restricts the number of allowances available. Capping the maximum
quantity of allowances available requires information about producers willing to
obtain allowances. This is the objective of the following paragraph where we
define a willing to buy function that plays a central part on the construction of
the Nash equilibrium.
Willing to buy functions
In this paragraph, we aim at guessing a Nash equilibrium candidate. We base
our reasoning on the dominant strategy on the electricity market alone (see
Proposition(3.1)). For a while, we consider an exogenous CO2 cost τ . The
producers marginal cost become for any τ ∈ [0, p], cτj , j = 1, · · ·J , c
τ
j (q) = cj +
τej , q ∈ [0, κj]. In this framework, the dominant strategy is also parametrized
by τ as Cτj (·) defined as in (15). In the same way, we define the clearing
electricity price and quantities in terms of τ only by
pelec(τ) = pelec({Cτj (·), j = 1 . . . , J})
ϕj(τ) = ϕj({C
τ
j (·), j = 1 . . . , J}).
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We determine two willing-to-buy-allowances functionsW(·) andW(·), following
a Dutch auction mechanism-like as follows :
W(τ) =
J∑
j=1
ejϕj(τ) and W(τ) =
J∑
j=1
ejκj1 {ϕj(τ)>0} (17)
Given the CO2 cost τ , the amountW(τ) represent the allowances needed to
cover the global emissions generated by the players who won electricity market
shares on the electricity market. W(τ) represent the allowances needed in the
case producers whish to cover their overall production capacity κj . Obviously
we have W(τ) ≤ W(τ). We now can state our last design assumption,
Assumption 3.3. On carbon market design. The number W of the al-
lowances available on the auction CO2 market satisfies
W(0) > W >W(p).
Proposition 3.2. As functions of τ , pelec(·) and
∑
j qj(·) are respectively in-
creasing and decreasing.
This proposition is a consequence of Remark 2.1, through cost parameter τ .
Assumption 3.3 allows us to define two prices of particular interest for the
construction of the equilibrium strategy:
τguess = sup{τ ∈ [0, p] s.t. W(τ) > W} and τguess = sup{τ ∈ [0, p] s.t. W(τ) > W}.
(18)
Lemma 3.1.
(i) We have W(τguess) = W.
(ii)W is a staircase function valued in the finite set {
∑
i∈I κjej; I ⊂ {1, · · ·J}}.
Let us define I(τ) := {j; qj(τ) 6= 0}.
Proposition 3.3. At τ guess, only one of the following two cases may occur :
Case A. There exists a unique producer, denoted i¯ such that I(τ guess) =
I(τ guess+)∪{i¯}. For i¯ we have 1
ei¯
(
pelec(τ guess)− ci¯
)
= τ guess and 1
ei¯
(
pelec(τguess)− ci¯
)
=
τguess.
Case B. There exists two producers, denoted il and ir such that
I(τ guess) = I(τ guess+)∩I(τ guess)∪{il} and I(τ
guess+) = I(τ guess+)∩I(τ guess)∪{ir}.
Proof. This follows directly from the fact that W(·) is a staircase function, and
from the fact that the producers are two by two different.
We define a strategy profile on the coupled market in the two cases.
Definition 3.1. We define the strategy profile (A, s)
∗
= ((s∗1, A
∗
1), · · · (s
∗
J , A
∗
J)),
where s∗j := Cj is the marginal production cost strategy and A
∗
j is defined as
follows (depending whether any of the two cases occurs):
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Case A.
For i¯, w 7→ A∗i¯ (w) := (τ
guess + δ) 1 {w < ei¯ϕi¯(τ
guess)− ǫ}
+ τguess1 {ei¯ϕi¯(τ
guess)− ǫ < w ≤ ei¯κi¯}
For k 6= i¯, w 7→ A∗k(w) :=
1
ek
(
pelec(τ guess)− ck
)
1 {w≤ekκk}
(19)
Case B.
For il, w 7→ A
∗
il
(w) := (τ guess + δ) 1
{0 < w ≤W−W(τ guess+)− ǫ}
+ τ guess1
{W−W(τ guess+)− ǫ < w ≤ eilκil}
For ir, w 7→ A
∗
ir
(w) := (τ guess + δ) 1 {w≤eirκir}
For k 6∈ {il, ir}, w 7→ A
∗
k(w) :=
1
ek
(
pelec(τ guess)− ck
)
1 {w≤ekκk}.
Now we can state our main result :
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumptions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, one can identify (ǫ, δ) such
that (A∗, s∗) is a Nash equilibrium. For this equilibrium the following applies
(i) the carbon price is τguess
(ii) the electricity price is pelec(τguess)
(iii) for any producer, the quantity of allowance bought is null if the quantity of
electricity sold is null,
The proof of this proposition relies on the analysis of any possible deviation.
It can be found in [3]. Note that the expression of the equilibrium is explicit,
which allows to explicit the quantity of emission. This allows a analysis of the
impact of such markets on the overall emission.
4 Conclusion
Once emitted into the atmosphere, CO2 will remain there for more than a
century. Estimating its value is an essential indicator for efficiently defining
policy. Therefore, carbon valuation remains a main issue in order to design
markets fostering emission reductions. In this paper, we established the links
between an electricity market and a carbon auction market through the analy-
sis of electricity producers strategies. They have been proven to lead to a Nash
equilibrium enabling the computation of equilibrium prices on both markets.
This equilibrium derives, for each producer, in a level electricity produced and
CO2 emissions covered. Beyond the analysis of the Nash equilibrium, we en-
visage the analysis of the electricity production mix, with a particular focus on
renewable shares which do not participate to emissions.
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